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Constructing the License to Operate:  
Internal Factors and their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions 
 
 
Voluntary programs intended to improve corporate environmental practices have proliferated in 
recent years. Why some businesses choose to participate in such voluntary programs, while 
others do not, remains an open question. Recent work suggests that companies’ environmental 
practices, including their decisions to participate in voluntary programs, are shaped by a license 
to operate comprised of social, regulatory, and economic pressures. Although these external 
factors do matter, by themselves they only partially explain business decision making, since 
facilities subject to similar external factors often behave differently. In this article, we draw from 
organizational theory to explain why we would expect a company’s license to operate to be 
ultimately constructed by internal factors, such as managerial incentives, organizational culture, 
and organizational identity, as these shape both interpretations of the external pressures and 
organizational responses to them. Using qualitative data from an exploratory study of matched 
facilities that reached different decisions about participating in a prominent voluntary 
environmental program, we then report evidence indicative of the role of these internal factors in 
shaping facilities’ environmental decisions. Finally, we offer suggestions for future research that 
could further develop understanding of how internal organizational characteristics influence 
environmental management decisions, including those concerning participation in voluntary 
programs. 
  
Constructing the License to Operate:  
Internal Factors and their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions 
 
What determines the environmental practices of individual companies and facilities? In 
particular, what leads some businesses to take actions that go beyond compliance with 
environmental regulation? Despite more than two decades of research devoted to these questions, 
scholars “still know little about why individual corporations behave the way they do in the 
environmental context, about why some companies, but not others, choose to move beyond 
compliance, or what motivates them to do so” (Gunningham et al. 2003: 135).  
Firms’ environmental practices are generally thought to result from a constellation of factors 
including regulatory requirements, competitive and economic pressures, evolving social 
demands and institutional norms, and technological innovation and adoption (Porter & van der 
Linde 1995; Hoffman 1997; Reinhardt 2000; Vogel 2005). Increasingly, scholars argue that 
companies experience possibly unique constellations of external pressures shaped by their 
community, location, economic sector, and interactions with critical external actors 
(Gunningham et al. 2003; Delmas & Toffel 2005). Such an approach, drawing attention to each 
firm’s or facility’s “license to operate” (Gunningham et al. 2003), begins to explain differences 
that have been observed in environmental management practices within and between industries 
(Prakash 2000; Gunningham & Kagan 2005).  
These explanations are incomplete, however, because they fail to take account of the fact 
that different firms, operating under similar regulatory, competitive, and social pressures, can 
develop starkly different environmental management approaches. Consider an example. Two 
competing manufacturing facilities located only miles apart produce the same specialized 
industrial component for the same set of customers. Both employ the same number of people and 
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both are among the largest employers in their mostly rural communities. In the not-so-distant 
past, both had been implicated in significant pollution problems in their communities, but both 
had more recently implemented sophisticated environmental management systems and had 
stayed in compliance with state and federal environmental regulations. Although similar in their 
customer base, line of business, community location, and overall environmental performance, 
these two facilities have made completely different choices about whether to participate in a 
federally sponsored voluntary environmental program. Why? In this article, we explore the 
choices made by these two companies, and other similarly matched pairs of facilities, by drawing 
attention to the internal factors that influence how managers interpret external conditions and act 
upon them. 
Even when external factors clearly influence companies’ actions on environmental issues, 
internal factors shape whether and how the external conditions are regarded as problems for the 
company in the first place, and internal factors also influence what solutions are deemed 
appropriate for addressing the identified problems (Lyles & Mitroff 1980; Dutton & Ashford 
1993).  “Problems” do not simply drop from the sky; they are formulated by managers as they 
selectively attend to cues from both insiders and outsiders (Lyles & Mitroff 1980). Individual, 
group, and organizational level factors have all been shown to contribute to business decision 
making, suggesting that “managers are guided in their choices as to what is important and why it 
is important by the interaction of the categories of issues they confront, their own experiences, 
and the natures of the teams and organization to which they belong” (Thomas, Shankster, & 
Mathieu 1994). 
In this article, we connect general insights about organizations to an emerging body of work 
that draws attention to the influence of internal factors specifically on businesses’ regulatory 
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behavior (Haines 1997; Barnes & Burke 2006). As others have acknowledged, firms’ decisions 
about their environmental operations can be affected by managerial perceptions (Andersson & 
Bateman 2000; Sharma 2000; Gunningham et al. 2003; Vandenbergh 2003), organizational 
culture (Forbes & Jermier 2002; Howard-Grenville 2006, 2007), and organizational structure 
(Delmas & Toffel 2005). Plant-level variables (such as size or age of facility) have been found to 
be better predictors of regulatory compliance behavior than corporate-level variables, suggesting 
that plant management plays an important role in determining whether and how a plant will 
comply or go beyond compliance (Gray & Shadbegian 2005). Connecting the behavioral 
determinants of internal plant-level decision making with observed environmental practices 
presents a key opportunity to understand better the processes and predictors of firm’s and 
facilities’ environmental management choices. Although it may seem readily apparent that both 
internal and external factors enter in to these choices, the internal factors have received markedly 
less systematic, empirical attention than have the external ones. Our intention in this article is to 
elaborate theoretically and empirically key organizational and individual factors that contribute 
to the construction of the license to operate and affect plant-level environmental decision 
making. 
We begin this article by briefly considering the literature on the determinants of beyond- 
compliance environmental practice and then proceed to articulate what we mean by the internal 
construction of the license to operate by drawing on selected insights from organizational theory. 
Next, we identify from prior work five key internal factors – managerial incentives, 
organizational culture, organizational identity, organizational self-monitoring, and personal 
affiliations and commitments –and explain how each could importantly shape environmental 
decision making. Following this, we report on our study of ten closely matched facilities. Five of 
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these facilities had chosen to participate in a voluntary environmental program, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) National Environmental Performance Track (NEPT), 
which offers recognition, networking opportunities, and certain types of administrative and 
regulatory flexibility to those that meet entry requirements. The other five matched facilities in 
our study had chosen not to participate in NEPT but share similar industrial processes, are of 
comparable size and output, have roughly equivalent environmental performance and 
compliance records, are subject to similar environmental regulatory permit requirements, and 
operate in demographically comparable locations in a single region. Interview data from facility 
managers show that at least three of the factors we explicate – the company’s identity, 
managerial incentive systems, and willingness to engage external constituencies (“self 
monitoring”) – differed between participating facilities and their matches, suggesting that these 
factors can indeed help explain environmental management choices. We conclude with 
implications and directions for future research that can extend our understanding of how 
companies’ licenses to operate are constructed by internal factors interacting with external ones. 
What Shapes Beyond-Compliance Environmental Practice? 
Understanding why and how firms adopt beyond-compliance environmental practices is a 
critically important question for both scholars and policy makers.1  Researchers have advanced 
several specific reasons for firms’ participation in voluntary environmental programs, a key form 
of beyond-compliance behavior. Participation in a voluntary program may provide financial 
savings (Maxwell & Decker 1998) or competitive advantage (Arora & Cason 1996; Lyon & 
Maxwell 1999), enable access to technical assistance (Khanna 2001; Delmas & Keller 2005), 
help firms pre-empt or weaken regulations (Segerson & Miceli 1998; Lyon & Maxwell 2002; 
Johnston 2006), or shape future regulations (Delmas & Terlaak 2001). Further, participation may 
create an image of environmental friendliness for customers, suppliers, employees, or the public 
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(Khanna 2001; Potoski & Prakash 2002), and demonstrate firms’ responsiveness to community 
and employee concerns (Henriques & Sadorsky 1996; Blackman & Bannister 1998; 
Gunningham et al. 2005).  
These benefits, however, may be contingent upon a number of factors including the firm’s 
competitive environment, exposure to regulatory or technological change, and the actions or 
demands of customers, investors, and community groups (Arora & Cason 1996; Reinhardt 2000; 
Vogel 2005). Further, there are a number of potential costs associated with participation in 
voluntary programs, including: (a) increased scrutiny by regulators, the news media, or the 
surrounding community; (b) concern about maintaining confidentiality of production-related 
information; and (c) direct management time and resource commitment (Delmas & Terlaak 
2001). As a result, voluntary programs may prove attractive or unattractive to firms for a variety 
of reasons that are not necessarily anticipated by those who initiate the programs. Indeed, some 
empirical studies find that firms with relatively poor environmental records and a history of large 
toxic releases relative to their peers are sometimes more likely to participate in voluntary 
programs (Arora & Cason 1996; King & Lenox 2000), suggesting that the desire for an image of 
strong environmental performance, not the more tangible financial or technological benefits, may 
motivate firms’ decisions to join. In the literature on corporate environmental management, the 
relatively simple notion that companies evolve through stages of increasingly advanced 
environmental practice (Hunt & Auster 1990; Roome 1992) in response to demands from 
regulators, customers, and financial markets (Gladwin et al. 1995; Shrivastava 1995; Kleindorfer 
2006) has now largely been replaced by a more nuanced view that acknowledges external 
contingencies that make the adoption of certain environmental practices more or less attractive 
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for certain firms (Esty & Porter 1998; Christmann 2000; Reinhardt 2000; Aragon-Correa & 
Sharma 2003). 
The License to Operate 
Increasingly, corporate environmental practices are seen as the result of multiple, possibly 
firm-specific, drivers that interact with each other, including those originating in regulatory, 
international, resource, and social domains as well as in the marketplace (Hoffman 2000). One 
way of conceptualizing these myriad pressures on a firm is as a “license to operate.” This label 
has been widely used by companies, analysts, journalists, and scholars to refer to the idea that 
industrial facilities must comply with tacit expectations of regulators, local communities, and the 
public in order to continue operations (Gunningham et al. 2003, 2004; Howard-Grenville 2005). 
Some have noted, importantly, that these aspects of the license to operate are not simply imposed 
on a firm; they are at least partially subject to negotiation and revision by the firm’s own actions 
(Gunningham et al. 2003). This view accords with recent work indicating that companies and the 
organizations they interact with jointly construct norms of legal compliance and standards for 
appropriate business conduct (Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger 1999; Hoffman 1999). 
Internal Factors 
Relative to the external factors that influence environmental management practice, internal 
factors have been understudied in the literature on voluntary corporate behavior. An 
accumulation of recent empirical work, however, suggests that internal factors matter. Managers’ 
commitment, perceptions, and leadership (Andersson & Bateman 2000; Egri & Herman 2000; 
Sharma 2000; Bansal 2003), organizational culture and subcultures (Forbes & Jermier 2002; 
Howard-Grenville 2006; Howard-Grenville 2007), and different organizational structures 
(Delmas & Toffel 2005) have all been found to influence the environmental practices adopted by 
firms. Others have argued that broader constructs of managerial commitment (Coglianese & 
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Nash 2001) or environmental management style (Gunningham et al. 2003) critically shape 
environmental practice and performance. These constructs may include personal attitudes 
towards environmental problems as well as individual orientations that are shaped by and help 
shape the organization’s culture and leadership (Vandenbergh 2003). 
Missing from much of this work on the internal influences of environmental practice is a 
theoretical underpinning grounded in the literature on organizational behavior. Also missing are 
empirical studies that control for external factors to enable a clear comparison of internal factors 
across companies. Without these, we are left with at best a partial sense of where a particular 
environmental management style comes from, why one style is distinct from another, and 
whether a particular style will tend to endure or change over time (Howard-Grenville 2005). 
Indeed, without refinement and theoretical anchoring, constructs like management style or 
commitment risk becoming catch-all categories for all that remains unexplainable once external 
factors have been accounted for. 
To address these needs, we draw from organizational theory specific internal factors that can 
be expected to contribute to corporate environmental practices. These factors generally have two 
effects: first, they shape whether and how members of a firm or facility interpret external 
regulatory, social, and economic conditions as problems in the first place, and, second, they 
influence how these members choose to solve the selected problems (see Figure 1). The first 
effect, known as “problem setting” (Schön 1983: 40), occurs when organizational structures, 
cultures, and subcultures channel and direct the attention of members to particular issues and 
orient them to specific goals (Simon 1947; Van Maanen & Barley 1984; Schein 1996; Ocasio 
1997; Howard-Grenville 2006). Individuals can be active participants in the formulation of 
problems from nascent issues, and their positions in formal and informal structures of power 
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contribute to whose interpretations have influence within a given company. Given this, it should 
come as no surprise that companies and individuals interpret similar environmental pressures 
quite differently; in other words, they “set up” different problems to solve based on the same 
external data. 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------  
Once problems are set, internal factors also shape how they are solved. Organizational 
structures, cultures, and systems of managerial incentives compel the use of certain favored 
“strategies for action” within a firm (Swidler 1986; Schein 1996; Howard-Grenville & Hoffman 
2003). When groups or individuals within an organization approach a given type of problem, 
they set about solving it using the knowledge, skills, routines, and resources that they possess 
and value. Of course, within any organization, different groups possess different types of 
knowledge, skill, and resources, and hold different interests and power (Carlile 2002), suggesting 
that the strategy for action ultimately adopted may represent the outcome of internal negotiation 
(Howard-Grenville 2006). Nonetheless, internal factors can differently influence the actions 
taken by organizations, even if they set themselves similar problems. Indeed, valued strategies 
for action tend to shape recursively the problems that firms’ members set for themselves as they 
attend more closely to the problems that their strategies are most suited to attain (Swidler 1986).  
Although problem setting and strategies for action may well be closely interrelated in 
practice, it is analytically helpful to separate them in order to understand, respectively, how 
internal factors shape the interpretation of external conditions and how internal factors lead to 
the development of solutions to address identified problems. Behavior within any company is a 
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function of a complex set of incentives, some that are largely independent of any given change in 
external environmental issues or indeed any other external issue. To explain further what can 
make problem setting and strategies for action differ between otherwise similar firms, we outline 
five key internal factors that, at a minimum, we would expect to contribute to the construction of 
a company’s license to operate: managerial incentives, organizational culture, organizational 
identity, organizational self-monitoring, and personal commitments and affiliations. Each of 
these internal factors is summarized in Table 1 and described below. Table 1 also notes several 
sources of evidence that may be used to understand whether and how each factor shows up in 
shaping problem setting and solving within a firm or facility.  
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Managerial Incentives. Managerial incentives include the formal and informal inducements 
that might encourage or dissuade a manager from taking some form of beyond-compliance 
behavior, like choosing to participate in a voluntary program. Managerial incentives stem from 
the company’s formal structure, which establishes channels of communication and influence as 
well as authorizes certain reward systems. Of course, a company’s “informal” structure is at least 
as important in shaping managerial incentives as is its formal structure. Informal structure is 
associated with the actual interactions and expectations operating within a company, capturing 
how power is exercised and how social networks shape the flow of information (Krackhardt & 
Hanson 1993). Both formal and informal structures influence who makes decisions, how 
decisions are made, and the degree of autonomy individual facilities and managers hold in 
decision making. For example, an environmental manager at a facility who reports directly to her 
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plant manager may receive greater attention to and support for environmental issues than a 
facility manager reporting to a centralized, corporate-level environment, health, and safety unit 
(Russo & Harrison 2005). When the overall manager of a facility is formally accountable for 
environmental management, the facility’s environmental manager may be much more important 
to the facility’s communication networks and decision making processes. In such a situation, the 
environmental manager may well be more willing to initiate actions that she believes would 
improve the facility’s environmental reputation or performance. The most straightforward 
incentive for many managers, of course, is in the form of compensation. Here empirical research 
has shown that tying a portion of plant managers’ compensation to environmental performance 
has a small positive effect on such performance (Russo & Harrison 2005).  
Formal and informal structures may have an independent effect on managers’ actions, but 
they also can shape managers’ perceptions of the issues themselves. For example, formal 
organizational structures establish which groups or departments interface with which external 
groups (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967), influencing who environmental managers come into contact 
with and whose concerns they hear. For example, with today’s environmental concerns 
extending far beyond those associated with production operations to encompass product lifecycle 
and many other concerns, managers in sales and marketing, finance, or strategic positions may 
be just as likely to encounter and interpret environmental issues as those in production functions. 
The degree of cross-functional coordination and control – structural and otherwise – within a 
company influences lateral and vertical information flows and hence awareness of environmental 
issues (Sharma et al. 1999). Clearly, those who are unaware of potential issues due to 
organizational arrangements will have little incentive to take action on them. 
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Organizational Culture. An organization’s culture can also affect managerial incentives, but 
more broadly it influences how problems are set and how they are acted upon.  Organization 
culture is regarded by many scholars as a system of meanings that operate within an organization 
and that shape its members’ daily actions (Gregory 1983; Smircich 1983; Meyerson & Martin 
1987; Schein 1992). Importantly, culture is not entirely negotiable (Douglas 1978); it is 
something an organization “is” rather than something that it “has” (Smircich 1983: 342). In other 
words, culture change cannot be so simple as changing a company’s mission and values 
statements, or adopting a new program, for culture is embedded in the everyday actions that 
people take throughout the company.  Whereas formal structures delineate who does what in an 
organization, culture influences how it is done and many of the cultural norms operating in 
organizations are tacit.  For example, are decisions only taken when “hard” data are persuasively 
presented?  Is consensus required for decisions to be made, or are individuals encouraged and 
trusted to pursue innovative approaches on their own?  Does the organization prefer 
“homegrown” solutions or is it open to new ideas from outsiders with different expertise and 
perspectives? Is risk-taking behavior discouraged or rewarded?  These are all aspects of an 
organization’s culture that can both influence how people regard external pressures and 
information, as well as how they act when faced with problems. 
For example, NASA’s actions during both the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle 
tragedies have been attributed to cultural factors (Vaughn 1996; Roberto et al. 2006). In each 
case, incomplete evidence hinting at the eventual technical causes of failure was held by 
engineers who were at relatively low levels of their organizations. A culture characterized by a 
reliance on hard data, and the need to meet a substantial burden of proof in order to unseat prior 
conclusions about safety and risk, made it difficult for these engineers to advance their concerns. 
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As one Columbia investigation board member noted, a cultural norm around decision making 
was “prove to me that it’s wrong, and if you prove to me that there is something wrong, then I’ll 
go look at it” (Roberto et al. 2006: 110). NASA’s culture strongly influenced which events and 
anomalies were labeled “problems” and, once labeled, how they were acted upon. More 
generally, culture helps explain a variety of organizational actions, whether they are prompted by 
internal or external events (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Snook 2000; Howard-Grenville 2007). 
Organizational Identity. Whereas organizational culture refers to the patterns of day-to-day 
actions within an organization, organizational identity refers to an overarching sense among 
members of “what the organization stands for and where it intends to go” (Albert, et al. 2000). 
Organizational identity is defined as that which is central, enduring, and distinctive about an 
organization as perceived by its members (Albert & Whetten 1985). In contrast to culture, which 
refers to patterns of meaning arising from day-to-day interactions within a company, identity 
emerges through interactions with the outside world (Hatch & Schulz 2002). Critical events can 
feed into a revision of a company’s identity and contribute to it on an ongoing basis. For 
example, the Brent Spar incident for Royal Dutch Shell triggered adjustments in employees’ 
impressions of the company and strongly influenced its subsequent efforts to shape its identity 
proactively (Hatch & Schulz 2002). 
Organizational identity shapes how managers view the work of their company or facility and 
how this is situated within a larger local, regional, or global community. For example, a study of 
how the New York Port Authority addressed the issue of homelessness at its facilities 
demonstrated the importance of organizational identity in the interpretation of issues (Dutton & 
Dukerich 1991). The use of Port Authority facilities by homeless people threatened the 
organization’s identity as a professional organization. Members saw the Port Authority as an 
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organization holding technical expertise but ill-suited to solving social service problems (Dutton 
& Dukerich 1991). This shared identity of technical proficiency and social service incapacity 
shaped the organization’s early approaches to the issue and the external salience of the issue 
made identity the primary lens through which members interpreted it. 
More generally, work on corporate social responsibility suggests that organizational 
identities are more salient to employees of some companies than they are for others 
(Bhattacharya & Sen 2003). For example, a consumer products company may have salient 
elements of its identity bound up in an image of green marketing and it may work hard to 
maintain this image. In contrast, a company that supplies raw materials to a third tier auto 
supplier will still have an identity, but its environmental aspects may be much less salient and 
important to its members.  
Organizational Self-monitoring.  A further internal factor, one that is related to but still 
distinct from those we have just discussed, shows up as a company’s propensity to engage with 
outsiders. We label this organizational “self-monitoring,” following the important psychological 
construct of individual self-monitoring (Snyder 1974). Organizational self-monitoring represents 
a set of choices about how an organization portrays its image to outsiders, in response to its 
impressions of those outsiders and the value it places on adhering to socially appropriate 
portrayals. It can show up as the degree of openness, trust, and reciprocity that an organization’s 
members have towards key external groups, including regulatory agencies, communities, activist 
organizations, and others.  
Individual self-monitoring refers to the extent to which individuals strategically cultivate 
their public behaviors and expressions (Gangestad & Snyder 2000). High self-monitors are 
highly attuned to appropriate social display and readily adapt their behavior to be situationally 
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appropriate; low self-monitors are not as concerned about the appropriateness of their social 
displays and hence their expressive behavior consistently represents their inner attitudes and 
dispositions. Importantly, both low and high self-monitors are equally capable of making 
judgments about appropriate social behavior and may have similar core identities; they just care 
differently about acting within social norms and express their identities differently. By analogy, 
organizational self-monitoring captures the fact that some organizations place more value on 
acting in ways that are socially appropriate, and consequently seek recognition and reward for 
their externally directed behaviors. Other organizations, populated by those who are equally 
aware of socially appropriate behaviors and equally committed to “doing the right thing,” 
nonetheless shun recognition or reward and actively avoid projecting such a public image.  
Of all the organizational factors we present here, organizational self-monitoring is the least 
developed in the literature. Yet we need look no further than companies’ public positions on 
climate change to garner useful examples. In many sectors, some companies have made highly 
publicized statements of their positions and commitments on climate change, while their industry 
counterparts – selling to the same markets – have remained silent on the issue. In neither case 
should the public statements be taken as fully indicative of the actual actions each company is 
undertaking to mitigate climate change impacts. They reveal, though, that different companies 
can place a different emphasis on their organization’s appearance to the outside world. More 
generally, we might expect high organizational self-monitors to undertake a large number of 
beyond-compliance or voluntary actions, particularly those that actively engage external 
audiences. Low organizational self-monitors might be equally attentive to environmental 
performance, but less likely to participate in programs that offer external recognition. 
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Personal Commitments and Affiliations. Finally, we expect that individuals’ own 
affiliations and commitments matter to how they set and solve environmental problems. For 
example, professional education, experience, and affiliations shape how people classify and 
categorize problems (Van Maanen & Barley 1984). Broadly speaking, engineers, managers, and 
operators have different concerns and approaches that can transcend the incentives or culture of 
any given company (Schein 1996). Members of particular professions interact through 
conventions, training, journals, and professional communications and these activities may 
influence the approaches they champion within their companies. For example, professional 
associations and their members likely play a key role in spreading and rationalizing certain 
environmental management practices, like the use of environmental management systems or 
other tools and techniques. 
Purely personal, individual factors can also influence how a manager perceives the benefits 
and costs of beyond-compliance environmental activities. A significant fraction of the workforce 
now identifies with environmentalism and it is increasingly accepted that employees will bring 
their personal commitments and values to work (Morrison 1991). One empirical study found that 
employees’ values, and their fit with their company’s values, influenced the scope and strength 
of responses to employee-generated environmental initiatives (Bansal 2003). Others have 
suggested that managers’ individual attitudes toward the environment can shape their 
organizations’ commitment to addressing environmental issues (Coglianese & Nash 2001). 
Interaction of Factors. Having elaborated five internal factors likely to affect business 
behavior, we do not mean to suggest that they all matter equally, in all circumstances.  On the 
contrary, we would expect that in some instances one or more of these factors will dominate over 
others, and that in some instances certain factors may well lie dormant. We would also expect 
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that the five organizational and individual-level factors that contribute to an internally 
constructed license to operate will interact with each other. For example, the most fervent 
advocate of environmental practices might be unable to convince her company to adopt a 
beyond-compliance program if formal and informal organizational incentives severely limit 
managerial discretion. Conversely, an individual with limited personal interest in environmental 
issues may nevertheless be guided by his company’s strong identity as an innovator and leader 
on environmental performance.  
A Study of Participation in a Major Voluntary Environmental Program  
 
Ultimately, it is an empirical matter how these internal factors interact with each other 
and with external factors, as well as the relative importance they play in affecting the overall 
license to operate. In this section of our article, we take advantage of interview data from a set of 
matched industrial facilities in an effort to begin to assess the preceding theoretical account of 
the types of internal factors that may influence businesses’ beyond-compliance behavior. Relying 
on our interviews, we examine an equal number of matched participants and non-participants in 
the EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track to see if we can observe any systematic 
differences between the two groups. While these interviews could not provide all of the detailed 
evidence suggested in Table 1, the data we did collect from our interviews suggest that at least 
three of the five internal factors have contributed to the differences in the environmental 
management choices made by the facilities we studied. 
The NEPT program seeks to recognize, reward, and encourage facilities that are “top 
environmental performers” (EPA 2005a: 2). The mission of the program is to improve 
environmental performance, transform relationships between facilities and agencies, and 
encourage innovation (EPA 2004a). To be admitted, a facility must have a proven record of 
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regulatory compliance, an operational environmental management system, a history of 
environmental achievements that go beyond legal requirements, and a commitment to 
performance reporting and outreach to the local community and the public. Facilities apply to 
NEPT by completing standard application materials and submitting them during one of two 
application cycles scheduled each year. Facilities must describe their environmental management 
system, submit an “environmental requirements checklist” detailing the environmental 
regulations they are currently subject to, and provide the names and contact information of three 
community references. Importantly, they must also make commitments to improve their 
environmental performance in ways that go beyond what they are required to do by law.2 If 
admitted, facilities are required to submit annual reports to EPA on their progress. Their 
membership lasts for three years’ duration, after which facilities must reapply. 
Facilities that are admitted to NEPT are offered recognition, networking opportunities, and 
certain kinds of limited regulatory and administrative incentives. For example, EPA allows 
members to use the NEPT logo at facility sites and in promotional materials, and the agency 
variously sends letters to relevant elected officials announcing a facility’s acceptance to the 
program, submits articles to trade journals about members, and highlights members’ names on 
the agency’s website. EPA has also deemed NEPT facilities to be a low priority for routine 
federal inspections (EPA 2006).3 In addition, NEPT plants are allowed to file certain required air 
pollution reports less frequently and may store hazardous wastes on-site for a somewhat longer 
period of time without obtaining a RCRA permit (EPA 2004b).  
Out of the hundreds of thousands of industrial facilities in the United States, only about 440 
have enrolled in NEPT as of September, 2007 (EPA 2007). With many eligible plants not 
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participating,4 NEPT presents a valuable opportunity to understand differences between 
participants and non-participants. 
Study Design 
We matched five facilities that chose to participate in NEPT (“NEPT facilities”) with five 
closely comparable non-participating facilities (“matched facilities”). Within each matched pair, 
the facilities shared similar industrial processes, were of roughly equivalent size and output, had 
similar environmental compliance records, and operated in demographically similar locations in 
the region.5 This matched data set allowed us to control for key factors that are known to shape 
facilities’ regulatory, social, and economic licenses to operate, enabling us to probe for internal 
factors that influenced the environmental management decisions made at each facility, including 
the specific decision about whether to join NEPT. This design overcomes an important limitation 
common to many studies of voluntary program participation. For example, the EPA’s own 
assessments of NEPT have focused only on participants (e.g., EPA 2003; EPA 2004a; EPA 
2005b; EPA 2006). Several scholarly articles have compared participants and non-participants in 
other voluntary programs (see, e.g., Arora & Cason 1995; Arora & Cason 1996; DeCanio & 
Watkins 1998; Khanna & Damon 1999), but the principal focus in the literature has remained on 
externally observable differences that are associated with participation. By focusing on internal 
factors, and choosing matched companies based on their decisions to participate in a single 
voluntary program, our study design opens up the possibility of discerning internal differences 
between otherwise similar participants and non-participants. 
We identified NEPT members for this study using the list of participating facilities by region 
on the EPA’s website. We focused on a single region with a large number of NEPT facilities (39 
at the time of the study). Since eighteen of these NEPT facilities (46%) had been in the program 
since its inception, we selected our sample from among these “charter” NEPT members. We 
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limited our sample still further by eliminating those facilities that were not subject to the EPA’s 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) reporting requirements. We also eliminated facilities owned by 
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., a company with 40 facilities enrolled in NEPT at its inception, far 
more than any firm.6 Of the remaining facilities, we selected for study all those for which we 
could find suitable matches.   
The following data were collected to match NEPT facilities with nonparticipating facilities: 
the four-digit SIC or NAICS codes, number of employees, sales, demographic profile of the 
surrounding community, and history of environmental regulatory compliance. We gathered 
information about facility size (number of employees and sales) from OneSource Information 
Services, Inc. We obtained data on community demographics, regulatory compliance, and 
environmental permitting from the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) 
and the U.S. Census. Using EPA’s Envirofacts database, we collected information about each 
facility’s total aggregate TRI releases during the period beginning 1987 through to 2003, the 
latest year for which information was available. We used the compliance, permitting, and TRI 
data to compare the facilities’ environmental performance. Table 2 summarizes characteristics of 
NEPT and matched facilities, using a pseudonym for each facility.  
-------------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
There was little difference between NEPT and matched facilities on dimensions of 
environmental performance. First, we found that both NEPT participants and non-participants 
had similar environmental performance records. Each of the facilities in our study had a “clean” 
compliance history; at the time of our interviews, none had been subject to any enforcement 
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actions by state or federal environmental agencies for the prior two years, according to EPA’s 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database.7 Further, the TRI data for the 
period 1987 to 2003 suggested similar overall trends in the reduction of TRI releases for all 
facilities.8 With one exception, all facilities had achieved reductions.9 We noted that three of the 
five NEPT facilities had reduced releases substantially in the early 1990s, while the matched 
facilities had lower releases to start out and had achieved further, comparable reductions more 
incrementally.  
All of the facilities we studied were subject to similar environmental regulatory permit 
requirements. All ten facilities had hazardous waste permits: four of the five NEPT plants were 
Large Quantity Generators of hazardous waste, while all five matching plants had this 
designation. Three NEPT facilities had active air discharge permits, while all five of the 
matching plants were subject to air permitting requirements. Two NEPT plants held water 
discharge permits, as did two matching plants. All plants had been inspected at some time by 
EPA or state environmental agencies. We attempted to match facilities whenever possible based 
on whether they had received a recent inspection, specifically within a two year period prior to 
our interviews.10
Finally, all facilities operated some form of environmental management system (EMS). All 
of the NEPT facilities were certified to ISO 14001, an international standard for EMSs, while 
only one matched facility had an ISO 14001 certified EMS. However, two of the other four 
matched facilities had independently certified EMSs and the remaining two operated non-
certified EMSs. Table 3 summarizes aspects of the facilities’ environmental performance, 
practice, and regulatory requirements. 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Data Collection 
In 2003 and 2004, we conducted in-person, not-for-attribution, semi-structured interviews 
with plant-level environmental managers at each facility. We focused our interviews at the 
facility level because from its inception NEPT has been a program aimed at participation by 
facilities, not overall companies. Once we had identified an appropriate non-participating match 
for each NEPT facility, every effort was made to conduct interviews at those plants. Where 
managers of nonparticipating facilities were not responsive, we repeated our requests and 
assured them that the discussion would not be attributed to them or their facilities. With 
persistence, we were able to conduct an interview with a plant-level environmental manager at 
every matching facility we had identified. By doing so, we reduced the bias that comes from 
limiting the selection of study facilities to those that readily take part in research about voluntary 
environmental programs. Interviews ranged in length from one to two hours and were tape 
recorded and professionally transcribed.  
Because we were interested in understanding the internal context for and influences on 
environmental decision making at the facility level, our interviews probed broadly for significant 
events, developments, and challenges each respondent perceived or experienced. Each 
respondent was asked about: 1) changes the facility had made in its environmental management 
in the preceding few years, reasons for these changes, and staff involved; 2) actions the facility 
had taken to improve awareness of environmental management activities and actions or 
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arguments that were or could be made to influence key decision makers; and 3) respondents’ 
experiences with voluntary programs in general and their perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
such programs to their facilities. Importantly, NEPT was not mentioned until late in the interview 
during the discussion of voluntary programs, unless the respondent volunteered information 
about the program earlier. This interview protocol allowed us to elicit respondents’ broad 
attributions and assessments of events or factors (external and internal) that shaped 
environmental management decision making and actions at the facility. In addition, by focusing 
on how the respondents sought to influence others, we were able to gather information on 
internal barriers or opportunities that might have been posed by structure, culture, or incentives. 
The interview guide was not shown to respondents in advance to ensure that they did not 
approach the interview as being “about” NEPT. Interviews proceeded in an open-ended fashion 
which resulted in the collection of rich qualitative data on how individual managers perceived 
their facilities’ environmental activities and performance, well beyond their participation or non-
participation in NEPT. Consistent with our exploratory qualitative research approach, we did not 
probe for specific information on organizational culture, identity, or self-monitoring in order to 
avoid presupposing key influences on environmental management. Instead, we used our 
interviews to gather manager’s own insights and gain detail that we used to develop further our 
theoretically derived factors.11
Data Analysis 
We began our data analysis by having each author read all interview transcripts individually, 
looking for emergent themes (Glaser & Strauss 1967). From these, we compiled a list of initial 
codes that we used to code the interviews qualitatively (Miles & Huberman 1994). Initial codes 
covered both external factors (e.g., customer demands, community pressures) and internal factors 
(e.g., managerial support, organizational structure, identity) mentioned by respondents as 
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important to their facilities’ environmental practices. We also included codes for respondents’ 
judgments of the value and effectiveness of NEPT and other beyond-compliance behaviors. A 
research assistant who was not aware of which facilities were members of NEPT coded the 
interviews in random order, starting with the list of initial codes and modifying them as new or 
different themes emerged from the data. The coding was done using Atlas.ti, a qualitative 
research software package. The research assistant discussed his coding with the authors and we 
iteratively arrived at a final list of codes and assured that the coding was applied consistently and 
comprehensively.  
Once the coding was completed, we performed both “within-case” and “between-case” 
analyses (Miles & Huberman 1994). For each facility, we summarized the results of the coding 
on a figure to represent the internal and external factors that, according to the managers 
interviewed, informed their environmental management practices and their decisions about 
joining NEPT or taking other beyond-compliance activities. We also attended to how the content 
of each set of codes differed between NEPT and the matched facilities, as groups. These 
comparisons are reported below. 
Factors Explaining Performance Track Participation 
The interview data showed no systematic differences between NEPT and matched facilities 
in how their managers viewed regulatory requirements, nor how they viewed other external 
social or economic pressures. In all cases, facility environmental managers regarded compliance 
with regulation as a given. As one NEPT participant noted, “it’s basically the rule of the land, 
you have to do this or do that.” A matched facility manager similarly observed, “you just can’t 
afford not to pay attention to this stuff.”  
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In addition, both NEPT and matched facility managers commented on what they perceived 
as inconsistent or irrational details of regulation. One NEPT manager gave the following 
example: 
We have to file the paperwork within 35 days. That's by federal law. One of the states 
said you have to file it in 30 days. So I don't know what those five days difference is 
going to do, aside from you're creating one more paragraph, you're creating one more 
law,…that is what I consider nonsense with the regulation. 
A matched facility manager similarly commented that “I never get a real strong sense that the 
regulatory community fully puts a lot of these things in perspective. And I have real trouble with 
EPA on that.”  Perhaps the only significant difference we encountered between NEPT and 
matched facility managers centered on how they talked about regulatory pressures. 
Notwithstanding some NEPT managers’ concerns about nonsensical regulation, more NEPT 
managers portrayed their relationship with regulatory authorities as trusting and flexible, while 
many of the matched facility managers expressed an overt lack of faith in the regulatory system. 
We consider these differences further when we consider organizational self-monitoring as one of 
the internal factors affecting the license to operate. 
Economic pressures for environmental practices were mentioned only infrequently in the 
interviews, with no systematic difference in the portrayals given by respondents from NEPT and 
matched facilities. By and large, the managers we spoke with represented the economic 
influences on their decisions in terms of supplier or customer demands. One manager was 
representative of others when, asked if his business customers cared about the facility’s 
environmental management practices, he responded, “some do, some don’t.” One NEPT 
manager observed that “[t]here is very little articulated demand for excellence from our 
customers.” 
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Similarly, social pressures were noted by both NEPT and matched facility managers but it 
was not clear that one set or the other faced systematically different pressures that shaped their 
environmental actions. Virtually all of the managers noted that maintaining a good relationship 
with the community was important, whether they felt their operations were hazardous or not. 
One matched facility manager observed, “if something [environmental] comes up, we present 
ourselves before the Town Council and they know us, they know us from the past … we have a 
good relationship with our community.” What did differ between the two groups of facilities was 
the value managers placed on this relationship with the community and other outsiders, relative 
to other priorities. We will address this point in more detail below in our discussion of the 
internal construction of the license to operate. 
Overall, we could not discern any significant difference between the NEPT and matched 
facilities based on the external influences typically regarded as comprising the license to operate. 
Neither economic nor social explanations were highly elaborated in the interviews, and 
differences were not apparent between NEPT and matched facilities on either dimension that 
would predict differences in environmental management activities. Further, the differences in 
perception and trust of regulators, rather than the regulatory environment faced, seemed to be the 
only significant difference between these two groups. Combined with the results reported earlier 
that showed almost identical environmental performance trends and compliance records, the 
interview data on external pressures suggests that we need to look further to explain the 
divergent behavior of the NEPT and matched facilities. 
Internal Factors and the License to Operate 
Earlier we identified five factors internal to companies that, based on theory and prior 
empirical evidence, we would expect to contribute to the construction of the license to operate. 
From our data set, we find notable evidence confirming the importance of at least three of these 
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five factors. We observed strong and consistent differences in the coded interview data in terms 
of managerial incentives, organizational identity, and organizational self-monitoring. That we 
did not find confirmation of the other factors does not necessarily mean they do not matter. Our 
method, constrained by our limited access to non-participating facilities, did not enable us to 
make a close analysis of organizational culture. The interviews also were not conducted 
specifically to discern personal commitments or professional affiliations that might shape 
perceptions and actions on environmental issues. The interviews did offer occasional hints at the 
importance of culture and personal commitments,12 but we found a much stronger indication of 
the importance of managerial incentives, organizational identity, and organizational self-
monitoring. In this section, we report representative interview evidence illustrating each of these 
three factors and how they varied between participating and non-participating facilities. 
Managerial Incentives. While the formal structure within each company was largely similar 
(for example, 9 facilities were part of a larger corporate structure),13 managers from the NEPT 
and matched facilities spoke differently about the degree of autonomy they enjoyed within such 
structures, the degree of support from their superiors in pursuing voluntary programs, and their 
tacit rewards and incentives for doing so. In other words, the informal aspects of the 
organizational structure seemed to create a different set of incentives for the NEPT versus 
matched facilities. 
NEPT facility managers spoke of very clear management support from both their direct 
management and from higher levels. One noted that “my boss, the director of operations for the 
site, backed me up when I found out about the [Performance Track] program and suggested we 
join.” Others spoke of the involvement and knowledge of corporate managers in their 
environmental programs, with one noting that a manager from the corporate office said, “Hey, 
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you might want to consider this [joining NEPT].” Similarly, NEPT managers spoke of the 
incentives they received to manage environmental programs in a certain way and the fit of 
Performance Track with these incentives. One noted that:  
It seemed to me that our readiness to participate in Performance Track was pretty good 
because they [management] were looking for very measurable and quantifiable things 
that you could say, OK, here’s where we are and here’s what we might set as some 
targets for future improvement. 
Another manager described how she had turned down business from her parent company 
because it would have required formulating chemicals that had been eliminated from the plant 
for health reasons. “My boss backed me up,” she added, “He understands that we need to keep a 
positive direction.” 
Although the majority of the NEPT facilities were part of a larger corporate structure, these 
managers tended to speak about the autonomy they had to implement programs that were 
consistent with corporate objectives. One observed that, in joining Performance Track, “we 
didn’t need signoff from our parent company, but they would have been supportive if we’d asked 
because it’s consistent with their philosophy of excellence.” Another noted that he pursued 
participation in Performance Track because it was a program that would help “gain that bottom-
line improvement that our management has come to expect of us.” 
The majority of the matched facilities were also part of larger corporations, but in at least 
several of these the organization’s structure and decision processes seemed to act more as a 
constraint than an enabler for individual facilities and managers. One matched facility manager 
noted that “the [parent] company provides for the environmental management system.” He added 
that participation in a voluntary program was “probably something of interest [to his site] but … 
we generally do things together,” noting that he had very limited autonomy to work outside the 
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programs prescribed by the corporate EH&S group. Another manager suggested that making a 
decision to participate in a voluntary program was not within his purview. He observed: 
 
I think of our site level as an operation site. You know, we have not talked about doing 
some of those programs. It’s really the worldwide environmental health and safety 
level. 
 
The matched facility managers also spoke of much less direct managerial support for 
voluntary programs. One said, “sure they [management] would care, but it’s a matter of degree. 
How much would they care?” Another manager suggested a relationship with corporate 
management that was very hands-off: “What I’m looking for is a handshake from our corporate 
environmental auditor.”  
These differences in incentives were associated with differences in perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of Performance Track. The NEPT participants generally regarded the program 
as relatively low cost to join and saw synergies between joining and using their existing 
environmental management process, such as ISO 14001 certification. One NEPT facility 
manager noted that, “because we already had our ISO 14001 certification at the time we joined 
PT, the costs have been pretty minimal. Just a few hours of my time.” Similarly, a second 
observed, “It was a fairly easy decision to join since we had most of the elements already in 
place. We had an EMS that had been certified in 1998.” One noted that “this initiative aligned 
perfectly [with our business] as have some others that we’re involved in within the community 
for example.” 
In contrast, managers from the matched facilities spoke of the significant costs of 
participation in voluntary programs in terms of time and resources. One commented that “you 
have all this stuff to worry about, and one of the things that’s important is to begin to prioritize 
things. You just can’t do everything.” Another added, 
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When we look at efforts we have a lot of justifications and investments, and we don’t 
do an awful lot of them just because they’re fun. I don’t have time to do something just 
because it might be interesting or personally gratifying. 
Incentives for these managers seem to be focused quite heavily on audits, and in particular, in 
satisfying internal or third party auditors. One manager remarked, 
When I have an audit, what’s in my mind is that I can answer all their questions and that 
they won't come back with significant lists of things to follow up on. 
Relative to other priorities, these managers saw the requirements of NEPT and other voluntary 
programs as distracting from their main focus. As one manager observed, “these are important 
programs, but so is getting product out the door safely.” 
Organizational Identity. Organizational identity came up when managers reflected on their 
external relations and the focus of their business. We saw some significant differences in how 
managers spoke about the identities of their companies and facilities.  NEPT managers spoke 
eloquently of their facilities’ commitment to strong environmental performance and noted that 
they raise environmental issues in communications with outsiders.  In contrast, matching facility 
managers spoke of environmental performance in much more practical terms.  
The NEPT facility managers’ comments often suggested an active stance on environmental 
issues. For example, one manager noted “our focus is on quality, health, and safety. That’s the 
core business at this site.” Furthermore, in this case, the manager cited the parent company as a 
strong proponent of environmental management which supported the facility’s efforts. Acquired 
by the parent three years earlier, the facility’s identity extended further back in time; “even 
before that we had a mindset of excellence,” the manager noted. 
NEPT managers also commented on how their image, particularly with the community, 
played into their efforts to cultivate or maintain a strong environmental identity. One commented 
that “we are now looking for outreach into the community and otherwise to continue our 
promotion in advancement of environmental awareness and that sort of thing.” Another admitted 
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that “we had been working on our public image because we did have a tainted past. We just 
thought that this would be another good way to promote ourselves as being environmentally 
aware and conscious.” 
An additional “measure” of managers’ openness is their response to requests to be 
interviewed. In all NEPT cases, it took only one telephone call following an initial contact letter 
to set up an interview. For three of the matched facilities, it took four or more calls. 
In contrast to NEPT facilities, managers from the matched facilities had more pragmatic 
expressions about their company’s identities which typically focused on “doing the right thing” 
including operating safely, staying within the law, and doing what made sense for the business. 
They saw environmental management as an important part of their identity – one manager said 
“if we had a choice to be known as environmental do-gooders versus environmental sinners, 
we’d take do-gooders every day.” But then, this same company largely shunned participation in 
voluntary programs as a way to develop this identity. Another manager noted that, “I think from 
a practical standpoint, we always try to do the right thing and we’re not as driven by regulation 
as by common sense and gut feeling.” Another asserted that “it’s our site, and we’re spending 
our money doing it. If it’s not done right, we’re going to have to re-do it. So of course we’re 
going to do it right.” Finally, one observed 
If you look to the bottom line, if you want to keep manufacturing more in order to 
minimize your footprint, you have to use less chemical[s], less water, try to generate 
less waste or try to recycle more. 
Consistent with this identity, these managers shunned the “paperwork” associated with voluntary 
environmental practices, including environmental management systems, and instead spoke of 
how they prioritized their actions to focus on tangible results. One summed up his facility’s 
decision not to participate in a government-run environmental voluntary program in this way: 
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It's more paperwork. And our company wants to do what's right; it has that moral intent 
to it. So if my job is the do the right thing I’d prefer doing it without making a big paper 
trail and making sure my i’s are dotted and my t’s are crossed. 
 
Organizational Self-monitoring. We saw considerable differences between the NEPT and 
matched facilities on the dimension of organizational self-monitoring, with managers from the 
NEPT facilities talking about how much they valued ties with regulators and positive relations 
with other external actors. Matched facility managers seemed less interested in recognition and 
spoke more of taking care of their business and its environmental impacts, rather than advertising 
their behavior to outsiders. 
Recognition from the immediate community was very important according to many of the 
NEPT facility managers. One noted that “if we can get in the newspaper having received some 
[state agency] or EPA award or some recognition … it plays well.” Another, commenting on the 
facility’s certified EMS and participation in voluntary programs, observed that “all of these 
programs are advertising. Some of the programs carry more weight, but every little thing can 
help in public relations and marketing.” Beyond the community, firms in this group wanted to be 
seen as environmentally aware with their employees. One commented that “if EPA stamps their 
approval on your facility program … that does wonders for the morale for people here as well as 
in the local community.”  
Contrast these comments with those made by matched facility managers who generally 
asserted that performance, not recognition, was most important in their relationships with others. 
One noted that “as long as we get it done, that’s what matters, not necessarily that we get 
recognized for it.” He added, “we should be reducing our risk. That’s what people care about.  
They don’t care about fluffy management practices.” Another manager echoed this sentiment, 
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saying, “at the end of the day it’s how many losses did you have, and did you have fewer 
injuries, fewer spills, fewer incidents.” 
There was a similar contrast between how NEPT and matched facility managers spoke of 
their interactions with regulators. Several of the NEPT managers were very open and forward in 
their interactions with regulators; they clearly valued building and maintaining a positive 
relationship with state and federal environmental agencies. For example, one NEPT manager 
noted that his facility had “built up positive karma … where now when we relate with a regulator 
we can relate in a position of trust.” This manager now felt comfortable going to the EPA and 
state regulators and “saying to them look, there are other ways of doing it [meeting regulatory 
requirements].” Another manager noted that “the recognition that EPA give us validates what 
we’re trying to do.” 
While some matched facility managers also recognized the need for good will between their 
facilities and regulators (e.g., “I think there’s definitely a correlation between… [the company] 
being proactive in some spaces and developing a relationship with [state regulators] that’s 
helpful”), others were very clear that they regarded regulators as untrustworthy and were 
unwilling to see them as partners. One manager, commenting on the EPA, suggested “they don’t 
trust anybody … and I don’t trust the agency.” Another observed that, 
They’re [the EPA] just too big, too dysfunctional, too many lawyers. Not enough risk 
people. And too focused in on command and control, too much paper, too much 
garbage, and not enough result. 
Rather than seeing themselves as capable of working in partnership with regulators, these 
managers actively dismissed this approach. One manager asserted 
EPA wants a partnership. I’m looking for a cop. Shut me down if I violate my permit. 
Otherwise leave me alone. 
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Like low individual self-monitors, managers in this group recognized what comprised 
socially desirable behaviors, and at times attempted to conform, but largely implied that 
conformance was not very important to them or their companies. One drew this analogy: 
[T]en years ago, our environmental commitment was like brushing our teeth. We did it 
every day, but we didn’t talk about it. Now we have a documented procedure for 
brushing our teeth and write a note every time we brush. We document everything 
because that’s part of being open. 
The behavior required to appeal to agencies, in this case the establishment of a formal EMS, held 
little intrinsic meaning to this manager. Another, commenting on standard practices expected of 
industry suggested,  
EPA comes in with a checklist. If I spent all my time taking care of what’s on their 
checklist, my plant would probably blow up. 
For these managers, like low individual self-monitors, performance itself, rather than adherence 
to outsiders’ criteria for performance, was most important. As one asserted, “It’s always nice to 
be recognized for advancement, but ultimately it’s the advancement that matters.” 
Discussion 
In this article, we have explored the internal factors that affect facilities’ licenses to operate, 
complementing but extending earlier work on the external (regulatory, social, and economic) 
aspects of licenses to operate. In order to bring together disparate work on internal factors that 
shape corporate environmental practices, we posited that the license to operate is affected by at 
least five core organizational and individual factors: managerial incentives, organizational 
culture, organizational identity, organizational self-monitoring, and personal or professional 
affiliations and commitments.  
Although the license to operate is clearly shaped by the external conditions the company 
faces and its historic engagement with outsiders around particular issues, there are strong reasons 
to believe the license also is independently influenced by internal factors. Because it is informed 
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by key organizational factors that are much larger than environmental management alone, the 
license to operate may be resistant to changes in external environmental pressures, or, 
conversely, responsive to changes in internal pressures that may be completely unrelated to 
environmental issues (e.g., a leadership change). For this reason, connecting particular external 
conditions or incentives to internal management or culture change (or vice versa) must be done 
very carefully. The causality of such connections is complex, and internal factors can create 
inertia or significant managerial agency (or both), each of which significantly influences a 
company’s responsiveness to external conditions.  
While our matched facility data support the argument that key internal factors – most 
notably in this study, managerial incentives, organizational identity, and organizational self-
monitoring – influence managers’ environmental management decision making, our analysis is 
certainly not exhaustive nor fully determinative. Our effort is a starting point for others to 
explore further the specific internal factors we have identified, as well as other factors that may 
contribute to the internal construction of a company’s license to operate. Several opportunities 
for future research are present. 
First, to test whether the three factors we found most prevalent in our interview data indeed 
influence environmental management decisions, one could design further studies of matched 
facilities. Selecting, as we did, a sample that includes both participants and non-participants in a 
single voluntary program, a survey could be designed to develop understanding of these three 
factors. Managerial incentives may be operationalized through questions about direct incentives 
(e.g., compensation tied to environmental performance), formal structure (e.g., vertical and 
lateral channels of communication and control), and informal influences (e.g., degree of direct 
management support for new initiatives in general, or environmental initiatives specifically). 
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Organizational identity could be operationalized through open-ended questions asking managers 
to describe in a short sentence what is central and distinctive about their company and its 
business approach, and questions that offered paired selections of identity descriptors (e.g. 
innovative vs. conservative) and asking managers to select one from each pair that best describes 
their organization. Finally, organizational self-monitoring might be measured through questions 
that assess the number and type of external engagements or partnerships the company or facility 
has initiated, or the propensity of managers in general to seek external outreach versus taking a 
more reactive stance. With a sample of sufficient size, factor analysis could be used to assess 
whether the various proposed measures of the three factors are meaningful, and regression 
analysis could be used to assess whether these factors (or others) influence the dependent 
variable, voluntary program participation, while controlling for other variables such as industry, 
size and demographic composition of the community. 
A second extension to this work could seek to extend, develop, and further understand the 
five factors proposed here by developing measures that would identify and discern each factor, 
as well as test which factors are more important than others. To develop measures, further 
qualitative research using in-depth interviews would be very helpful to gain insight into, for 
example, the impact of organizational culture on environmental decision making. This type of 
research could be used to inform future survey research that could operationalize and test all five 
factors (and any others that are suggested by the qualitative studies). In addition, comparative 
research across industries, types of facilities, or types of voluntary programs could be used to 
understand the combinations of internal factors that might be particularly important (or 
unimportant) in shaping managerial decision making on environmental issues. Of course, any 
such study would have to control for external conditions or other influences. Single companies 
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that operate a large number of facilities may be useful cases to study as they hold constant at 
least some of the variables (e.g. corporate structure) allowing for potential variance to be 
observed in others (e.g., manager’s personal affiliations or commitments). Of course, in any such 
study the outcome variable (e.g. participation in a voluntary program) would have to represent, 
as with NEPT, a decision by the facility rather than the corporation overall. 
Finally, better understanding of the interaction between internal and external factors on 
environmental decision making could be gained from longitudinal case studies. While the 
questions of controls and comparability are ever-present in such approaches, case studies of 
handfuls of facilities over a long period of time could be very valuable in developing a clearer 
understanding of the processes by which internal factors and external conditions interact. 
Methods such as in-depth interviewing and direct observation would be valuable to develop a 
close understanding of internal factors, as well as insight into how managers interpret external 
conditions and set and solve environmental problems. 
Conclusion 
Those who have pointed to internal, managerial factors as shaping corporate 
environmental practices have had good reason to do so, for external factors cannot tell the full 
story. In this article, we have attempted to provide both theoretical and empirical grounding for 
the internal factors that shape decisions to adopt certain beyond-compliance behaviors. Our 
analysis has several implications for the literature on corporate environmental practice and 
beyond-compliance behavior, and for practice and policy in these areas. First, by articulating five 
internal factors that we expect contribute to how particular companies select problems for 
attention and act on them, we extend and elaborate in greater theoretical detail the constructs of 
environmental management style (Gunningham et al. 2003) and managerial commitment 
(Coglianese & Nash 2001) that have been deployed in the literature to date. Better understanding 
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of the complex interactions between internal organizational factors and external pressures in 
shaping environmental decision making, and ultimately environmental performance, can be 
gained by further studies that develop and test the internal factors we have analyzed here. 
 Second, our empirical data suggest that there is likely a set of businesses that seek and 
obtain recognition through a constellation of beyond-compliance initiatives, and another set that 
does not. Just as individuals differ in their self-monitoring behavior – namely, in how closely 
they match their public behaviors to socially desirable displays and in their desire for recognition 
– our data suggest that businesses have analogous propensities. This finding could have 
immediate implications for how voluntary environmental programs are evaluated. For example, 
surveying managers to see how satisfied they are with the voluntary programs they join may be 
rather meaningless, since almost by definition those who join are happy to join (Coglianese 
2003).  
Finally, our findings serve as a caution for outsiders not automatically to identify those who 
seek and receive recognition as leaders and those who do not as laggards, for they may perform 
equally well in terms of compliance and pollution reduction. Companies shape others’ images of 
them, and such images can influence the pressures external organizations place on them 
(Gunningham et al. 2003; Howard-Grenville 2005). Given this fact, we can probably expect 
companies that value and seek external recognition to engage in activities that positively reshape 
external aspects of their licenses to operate, while those who place less value on external 
recognition not to do so. While the ability of companies to influence external pressures could be 
taken as an argument for companies to engage proactively in beyond-compliance behavior, it 
should also be taken as a warning to observers of such behavior not to overestimate the 
differences in performance among firms that cultivate external recognition and those that do not.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Following Gunningham et al. (2003) and others, our focus is explicitly on beyond-compliance behavior, although 
we suspect that much of our theoretical account and empirical findings could also bear on business decisions about 
complying with regulations.  The differences, if any, in explanatory models for compliance and beyond-compliance 
behavior merit further inquiry but extend beyond the scope of this article.
2 Facilities with fewer than 50 employees must make only two such commitments; larger facilities must make four.   
3 Some state environmental departments also avoid inspecting NEPT plants on a routine basis. 
4 Determining the number of facilities that would be eligible for the program is difficult. Some 5,000 facilities in the 
United States have become certified to ISO 14001, the international environmental management system (EMS) 
standard, and would meet the program’s EMS requirement (ISO 2006). Many more facilities have implemented 
EMSs that would probably still qualify them for Performance Track. 
5 To be sure, outside of a laboratory setting, no such empirical matching effort will be perfect along every 
dimension.  Like others who have used a similar research design in other areas (e.g., Shapiro 2002), we claim only 
to have made the best possible effort to match facilities on observable characteristics.  The facilities in our study 
were matched in the first instance by operating in precisely the same line of business and in the same EPA region.  
Other characteristics, such as the number of employees or community demographics, cannot be exactly the same but 
are sufficiently comparable that we do not expect any of the modest differences to explain differences in behavior.   
In selecting these five matched pairs, we rejected other possible matches where differences in observable 
characteristics were more pronounced. 
6 Starting with the launch of NEPT, Johnson & Johnson had announced a corporate-wide commitment to have all of 
its facilities join EPA’s program.  We therefore excluded its facilities from our study for two reasons.  First, since no 
other major corporation had made a similar company-wide commitment at that point, we concluded that Johnson & 
Johnson facilities would not represent the “typical” case of a facility deciding whether to join NEPT.  Second, the 
very fact that Johnson & Johnson facilities joined because of a corporate directive provides support all on its own for 
the importance of internal factors in explaining business behavior.  Facility managers within Johnson & Johnson 
clearly found themselves facing different managerial incentives – not to mention other organizational factors – than 
did managers at facilities elsewhere.  Excluding Johnson & Johnson from our sample therefore followed appropriate 
qualitative research methods by ensuring that we did not select cases that would be more likely to support our 
theoretical prediction that internal factors affect beyond-compliance behavior (King, Keohane & Verba 1994).  
7 Using ECHO, we also checked for any other indication of a regulatory violation at our respondent facilities.  For 
the three years prior to our interviews, we found no violations for any of the facilities included in our study.  
Subsequent to our interviews, we did discover that one of the matched facilities had one “non-significant” violation 
for one quarter within the three-year period. It is not uncommon, of course, for regulated facilities to have a minor 
violation from time to time. In fact, one can search ECHO and find that in 2007 about twenty-percent of all the 
Performance Track facilities in the database had a violation noted, about a dozen of which actually were listed as 
being “significant.” 
8 Because our goal was to assess overall trends in TRI releases, we did not attempt to normalize releases but 
compared each matched pair’s trends in aggregate releases over time. 
9 At one matching facility, toxic releases had increased following a change in the products manufactured at the site. 
10 Interestingly, three of the five NEPT plants had been inspected in recent years even though the EPA offers low-
inspection priority as a benefit to NEPT members. 
11 At each facility, we interviewed the key environmental manager who would have been most closely involved in 
the facility’s decision about participating in NEPT.  With the exception of one NEPT facility where our interview 
consisted of a meeting with the facility manager and plant manager together, our study is limited to only one 
respondent per facility.  While more interviews at each facility would always be better, the practical constraints of 
obtaining any access at all to non-NEPT facilities were such that obtaining more than a single interview was often 
not feasible.  For symmetry, we similarly limited our interviews for NEPT facilities wherever possible.  Given the 
early stage of overall research on internal factors affecting beyond-compliance behavior, and the necessarily 
exploratory nature of our empirical work, the number of interview respondents is clearly not inappropriate.  Our 
number of respondents per facility is comparable to that found in studies that rely on survey methods, and not out of 
line with other interview-based studies. 
12 The lack of evidence about cultural influences is to be expected, partly as a result of the study design. It is difficult 
to gain insight into culture without repeated observation as members often have a hard time articulating their own 
 38
                                                                                                                                                             
culture (Schein 1992). This limitation in our design could be overcome in a study that gained a more holistic 
understanding of organizational culture through direct, longitudinal observation supplemented with in-depth 
interviews. 
13 These corporate structures typically consisted of multiple plants producing products for a single industry and 
reporting to a corporate parent. They did not include subsidiary relationships or other forms of corporate control.  
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Table 1.  Organizational Factors Contributing to Problem Setting and Strategies for Action 
 
Factor Definition Sources of evidence 
Managerial incentives Opportunities (or lack thereof) for managerial initiatives 
and actions, stemming from the structure, rules, and 
routines of the organization and the informal patterns of 
influence and control. 
• Formal reporting structure 
• Patterns of information flow 
• Approval procedures 
• Compensation schemes 
Organizational culture System of meanings and norms that shape daily action and 
interactions within a company, i.e., “the way things are 
done.” 
• Tacit norms of behavior 
• Observed, repeated patterns of 
interaction 
• Rules revealed through actions that 
breach them 
Organizational identity Members’ perceptions of what is central, enduring and 
distinctive about their company, i.e., “what kind of 
company we are.” 
 
• Members’ statements of what the 
organization “is about” 
• Reflections of what is threatened when 
outsiders are critical of the organization 
Organizational self 
monitoring  
Choices about how an organization portrays its actions to 
outsiders, in response to its impressions of those outsiders 
and the value it places on adhering to socially appropriate 
portrayals. 
• Public portrayals through media, 
website, and community outreach 
• Number, variety, and scope of 
partnerships or associations with 
external groups 
Personal commitments 
and affiliations 
Individual members’ professional experiences, education 
and training, and personal interests and values that 
influence their awareness of and perspectives on 
environmental issues. 
• Professional backgrounds 
• Memberships in other business or 
environmental organizations 
• Stated values 
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Table 2.  NEPT and Matched Facilities:  Comparison of Size and Community Demographics 
  
Facility 
Pseudonym 
Number of 
Employees 
Sales  
($ in millions) 
% Community 
Designated 
“Urban” * 
Aero Inc. 
Matched Facility 
500 
700 
75 
60 
48 
82 
Chem Co. 
Matched Facility 
750 
620 
858 
200 
98 
100 
Glue Co. 
Matched Facility 
63 
100 
33 
33 
99 
100 
Rubber Inc. 
Matched Facility 
900 
700 
50 
50 
99 
72 
Tech Co. 
Matched Facility 
6,000 
8,000 
1,000 
5,000 
99 
98 
 
* As a rough indicator of community characteristics, we calculated the percentage of each facility’s zip code designated as “urban” 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table 3.  NEPT and Matched Facilities:  Comparison of Compliance, TRI Releases, and Permitting  
 
Facility Pseudonym Subject to Recent 
Enforcement Action 
Trend in TRI 
Releases  
Hazardous Waste 
Permit 
Air Permits 
 
Recent Government 
Inspection 
Aero Inc. 
Matched Facility 
No 
No 
Down 
Down 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Chem Co. 
Matched Facility 
No 
No 
Down 
Down 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Glue Co. 
Matched Facility 
No 
No 
Down 
Up 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Rubber Inc. 
Matched Facility 
No 
No 
Down 
Down 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Tech Co. 
Matched Facility 
No 
No 
Down 
Down 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Figure 1: The Construction of the License to Operate  
 
Conditions Problem Setting Solution/Strategy 
for Action 
Adopted 
Environmental 
Practice 
External Factors 
• Regulatory 
• Economic 
• Social 
Internal Factors 
• Managerial Incentives 
• Organizational Culture 
• Organizational Identity 
• Organizational Self-monitoring 
• Personal Commitments and Affiliations  
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